A record of storms survived and horizons still calling

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Inspecting the Colonies: Lüshun

Lüshun was somewhere I had wanted to visit for years.

I first discovered it as Port Arthur while reading about the Russo-Japanese War: a conflict almost forgotten in Britain and much of Europe, but certainly not forgotten here, in Japan or in Moscow.

The war announced the arrival of Japan as a modern great power. Much of the world expected Russia to win. Russia was a vast European empire with seemingly limitless reserves of men. Japan had emerged from feudal isolation only a few decades earlier.

Japan went for it and won.

At the centre of the struggle was one of the finest natural harbours in northern China. The Qing government had begun developing Port Arthur as a naval base in the nineteenth century. Russia leased it in 1898, expanded the harbour and fortifications, and connected it to the Chinese Eastern Railway and the wider Trans-Siberian system.

Then Japan attacked.

The siege of Port Arthur anticipated the industrial slaughter of the First World War. Trenches, concrete forts, barbed wire, machine guns, mines and heavy artillery turned hills into killing grounds. Infantrymen were repeatedly sent against positions designed to destroy them.

The figures vary, but the scale does not. The Japanese Third Army suffered about 58,000 battle casualties during the siege, while roughly 34,000 more men became sick. Russian land casualties ran above 30,000, and tens of thousands of survivors entered captivity when the fortress surrendered in January 1905.

It was victory by industrial attrition.

More than a century later, I arrived at Lüshun station and immediately knew that I had entered minor tourist territory. A man intercepted me outside and began trying to sell me a taxi tour.

I declined.

It must be getting difficult for the traditional guides. A foreign visitor can now arrive in an unfamiliar Chinese town having already used artificial intelligence to identify every site, place them in order and obtain their Chinese names. A taxi-hailing application will then summon a private driver directly to the pavement.

Mine carried me to the East Jiguanshan battlefield for 9.5 yuan.

The visitor centre had a large car park, so the place must become busy at certain times of year. On that particular day, beautifully, it was almost empty. I bought my ticket and walked uphill towards the North Fort, one of the positions around which the final destruction of the Russian defence took place.

The Chinese have done a good job of maintaining the site without polishing the life out of it. Essential work has been completed, paths made safe and several Russian guns preserved. Yet much of the fort has simply been left where the battle abandoned it, slowly ageing on the hillside.

That is as it should be.

The concrete remains pocked with bullet and shell damage. Underground passages lead into ruined chambers. The Japanese mined their way through the defences and blew open a breach before forcing an entrance. Walking through the place where they broke in, with almost nobody else present, conveyed more than another immaculate military museum ever could.

The most sombre point was the casemate where a Japanese 280-millimetre howitzer shell made a direct hit on 15 December 1904. General Roman Kondratenko, regarded as the heart of the Russian defence, was killed there with members of his staff. Port Arthur surrendered eighteen days later.

The Japanese later erected a granite monument at the place where he died.

It is still standing.

I was also surprised to find that the main Japanese war monument within the fort was still standing and appeared to be well maintained.

That surprised me. China and Japan do not enjoy the easiest historical relationship, and I have repeatedly noticed that Japanese buildings in China tend to meet a more brutal fate than Russian or European ones. Yet here the Chinese had retained not only the Russian fort, but the monuments erected by the Japanese victors—including their memorial to a respected Russian enemy.

Most of the time I wandered alone. I encountered one small group of Russians who had evidently come to inspect their own country’s imperial remains. They were the first white people I had seen for several days. Then they moved on and the fort became quiet again.

The sun appeared briefly. From the high ground, the military logic of the place became obvious. Russia had invested heavily in these forts because they commanded the approaches to a superb harbour. The height, the field of view and the complexity of the defensive system turned the landscape itself into a weapon.

I had intended to continue up to the Wangtai Battery. Unfortunately, an injured ankle made the climb unwise, and the courtesy buses did not appear to be operating. I therefore summoned another private driver for the princely sum of about ten yuan and continued into central Lüshun.

The ordinary streets contained another layer of the old Japanese city. Houses from the 1920s and 1930s were still being used, but not appreciated. They remained recognisable beneath later additions, neglect and decay. I did not photograph them. They were not exhibits. They were simply old buildings being consumed by ordinary life.

The grander Japanese architecture had fared better. Several Art Deco buildings remained around the centre, including former Japanese banks which had become Chinese banks. Empires departed. Banking survived.

I bought some lunch and sat in the square. Two Chinese women approached and began a conversation through translation applications. One told me that she was sixty-five. Her friend appeared to be about the same age.

They asked where I was from.

Then they asked my age.

Then whether I had ever been married.

Then whether I had children.

At first I assumed that this was ordinary curiosity. By the time they asked whether I would like to marry again, I realised that I was being assessed.

Chinese marriage markets are famously direct. Years of the one-child policy concentrated the future of many families into a single son or daughter, watched by two parents and four grandparents. Public matchmaking became family business. Age, education, property, occupation and income are not treated as mysterious matters to be discovered after six months of courtship. They are market information.

The women informed me that they could find me a good Chinese woman.

Then came the decisive question.

What was my monthly income?

My God. I had been placed on the Lüshun matchmaking circuit.

It was one of the few times in my life that I had encountered women who stated the market mechanism openly instead of hiding its terms behind words such as “romance”, “love” and “security”. In this respect, China is light years ahead of the West, where men have yet to wake up to the truth.

I had learned long ago that when women began asking about a man’s income and assets, it was never a good move for the man.

By now the conversation had become hilarious because it was proceeding exactly like the Chinese marriage-market videos I had watched before the trip. The only sensible course was to destroy my own valuation before somebody produced a suitable candidate.

I explained that five children had been expensive. So had the divorce. I had also just quit my job.

“Oh. What a shame.”

Their interest evaporated. Fortunately, I had finished my lunch. We smiled, I thanked them for the conversation, and I left the market with my freedom intact.

There was one more imperial monument to inspect.

Another private driver carried me up Baiyu Mountain to the great Japanese tower overlooking the harbour. Originally called the Tower in Honour of Loyalty, it was completed in 1909 to commemorate the Japanese dead of the siege.

It is an extraordinary imperial structure: 66.8 metres of stone, concrete, columns and calculated vertical power. Like so many imperial monuments, it reaches backwards into the architectural language of Greece and Rome while proclaiming the arrival of something aggressively modern.

The official explanation is that the tower resembles a memorial candle, with its pointed summit modelled on a 280-millimetre howitzer shell. Perhaps. The distinctly phallic alternative hardly requires a trained eye. Victorious empires do not normally choose their vertical symbols by accident.

Whatever its symbolism, the monument is magnificent. So is the view. From the summit, the harbour, naval base and surrounding coastline are laid out below. The strategic importance of Lüshun becomes undeniable. It controls a superb natural port near the approaches to the Bohai Sea, with the Korean peninsula and Japan beyond. The flags have changed, but the geography has not. The Chinese Navy has every reason to value the position as highly as the Russians and Japanese did.

Again, I was amazed that the tower had survived. A large fortress-like Japanese building beside it had not been treated so well. Its entrances had been bricked up and the structure was being left to decay. The monument remained dominant over the town while part of the complex beside it quietly rotted away.

I ordered another private driver for the descent and entered what I believed was the local railway station as my destination.

It was the wrong station.

This proved to be the best navigational error of the day.

The car deposited me at the old Lüshun railway station, a beautiful Russian-style building of yellow walls, white timbering, green roofs and a domed tower. Passenger services ended in 2014, but the building has been restored and remains one of the finest surviving stations of the old imperial railway system.

Lüshun was the southern terminus of the Russian-built branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway, connected northwards into the Trans-Siberian network. The line joined the port directly to the machinery of Russian expansion across Asia.

Then I noticed a much smaller boarded wooden building on the opposite side. I assumed that it had been a temporary shop from the period when the grand station was built. Its survival seemed extraordinary amid the high-rise apartments surrounding it.

The truth was even better.

That modest building appears to have been the original Russian station, opened when the railway reached Lüshun in 1903 and later used by the railway police. The elegant station opposite was begun from a Russian design but completed under Japanese rule after the war.

The temporary building was the original. The building which looked perfectly Russian had been finished by Japan. Lüshun had compressed the transfer of empire into two structures facing one another across a road.

I had meant to find the railway station. By selecting the wrong one, I had found both.

After a few photographs, I summoned one final private driver to the correct modern station and took the metro back to central Dalian.

I returned to the hotel exhausted and deeply contented. Lüshun had existed in my mind for years as a place in history books: Port Arthur, the great siege, the moment Japan announced itself and the industrial battlefield which warned Europe what was coming.

Now I had walked through the breach, stood where Kondratenko died, looked down upon the harbour, been assessed by the local matchmakers and discovered the remains of two empires because I entered the wrong destination.

The wrong station had been the right ending.

One Billion Euros a Day

I watched Europe discuss its trade deficit with China. Then I went to Yantai Port and saw the answer.

This morning, before leaving my hotel in Yantai, I watched Euronews discussing the latest round of trade talks between China and the European Union.

The central figure was almost too large to absorb.

In 2025, the European Union imported €559.4 billion of goods from China and exported €199.6 billion in return. The deficit was €359.8 billion.

Almost one billion euros a day.

The discussion was about what China might concede, what Europe might restrict and how the relationship could be “rebalanced”. There was talk of subsidies, market access and unfair competition. All of these may form part of the calculation.

But nobody appeared willing to ask the more dangerous question.

What has Europe done to its own ability to produce?

The Cost of Making Things

Europe has spent years making reliable energy expensive.

Germany closed its last nuclear power stations. Coal was burdened before dependable replacements were ready. Cheap Russian gas disappeared. Taxes, carbon costs, regulation and political indecision accumulated on top of one another. The result is not theoretical. The International Energy Agency estimates that electricity for energy-intensive industry in the European Union cost more than 50 per cent more than in China in 2025.

Then Europe expresses surprise when energy-intensive production moves elsewhere.

China is not sentimental about the energy required to run a civilisation. It burns coal, builds nuclear power stations, dams rivers, covers enormous areas with solar panels and erects wind turbines at scale. The energy source may change. The governing principle does not.

The power must exist.

Europe increasingly treats energy as a moral performance. China treats it as an industrial input.

The same difference appears in labour.

Europe has made work expensive and non-participation viable. It pays people to be useless, sometimes for generations.

At the same time, it imports large numbers of people from dubious countries without regard to intelligence, usefulness or cultural fit. Many become useless drains on the society that admitted them, consuming more in welfare, housing, healthcare, policing and public services than they produce in tax or useful work. That is not labour supply. It is parasitic immigration.

Europe taxes the productive economy twice: first to support non-contribution, and again to absorb the damage produced by bad selection.

Several Chinese people I spoke to were genuinely baffled by this.

“Why are you doing this?” they asked. “We would never accept it.”

They were not presenting an elaborate political theory. They simply could not understand why a civilisation would penalise the industries and people that sustain it while subsidising those who do not.

It is a fair question.

At Yantai Port

Then I switched off the television and went to the port.

The answer was waiting there in steel.

Yantai Port was full of ships: cargo vessels, ferries and working craft of every size. Cranes moved above them. Goods were being loaded, passengers processed and routes maintained across the Bohai Sea and beyond.

This was commerce. Not commerce as a paragraph in an EU communiqué. Not commerce as a political slogan. Goods, machinery, labour and capital were physically moving.

Yet the great ships were only half the scene. Along the water were smaller oyster and shellfish beds, tended by ordinary people operating at an entirely different scale.

The port contained both ends of a functioning economy: immense industrial capacity and small productive enterprise sharing the same stretch of water.

The sea was not scenery. It was working.

A Cabin to Dalian

My own place in this machinery was a first-class private cabin on the ferry to Dalian.

It was clean, comfortable and mine for the six-hour crossing. I could close the door, lie down and sleep while the ship carried me across the water. The equivalent in Europe would either not exist or would be priced at a level I would refuse to pay.

China is not frictionless. The procedures can be opaque. The ticketing can be peculiar. Translation can become an expedition of its own. The efficiency is not always polished.

But it works.

When a practical problem appears, somebody usually tries to solve it. The passenger is moved, the cargo is loaded and the ship leaves. The Chinese system can be clumsy at the edges and formidable at the centre.

Europe has become increasingly skilled at the opposite: polished presentation surrounding declining capacity.

The Wrong Negotiation

China certainly supports its industries. It protects parts of its market, directs credit, builds infrastructure and uses the power of the state to advance national production. Europe may reasonably respond to those things.

But they are not the whole explanation.

A subsidy cannot load a ship. A tariff cannot manufacture competence. Political protection cannot substitute indefinitely for abundant energy, trained labour, functioning ports, industrial scale and a culture which still expects systems to produce a result.

Europe wants China to buy more European goods while steadily making European goods harder and more expensive to produce. It wants Chinese prices without Chinese scale, Chinese infrastructure or Chinese seriousness. It wants the output while rejecting many of the inputs.

So the officials fly to Beijing and ask China to rebalance the result.

The imbalance was also made in Europe.

Tariffs may slow the ships. Regulations may obstruct their cargo. Trade negotiations may purchase time. None of them will make energy cheaper, rebuild a closed factory or turn subsidised non-participation into productive work.

By evening, this ferry will reach Dalian. Six hours across the water, with a private cabin in which I can sleep. Beyond the port waits the Russian and Japanese history of the city. Behind me, Yantai will continue loading ships and tending shellfish beds.

Brussels will continue talking about China.

The real question is not why China sells so much to Europe. It is why Europe chose to make itself so expensive, so administratively heavy and so tolerant of non-contribution that buying from China became the rational decision.

The deficit is not merely something China did to Europe.

It is the invoice Europe writes to itself one billion Euros at a time.

What China Remembered About Drink

I came to China expecting bullet trains, smart factories and the remains of old empires. I did not expect to find Europe’s drinks cabinet waiting for me.

Everyone else had left the cellar when the woman came over with a single glass of red wine.

“Please taste our best red wine,” she said. “This is the one that won the awards.”

The Chinese visitors had gone. I was the only person left. She had not poured it for the group. She poured it for me.

It was excellent.

Perhaps she had watched me tasting the earlier wines and decided I knew what I was doing. I had taken a wine course once. One of my best investments in choosing wines appropriate to the food. Or perhaps Changyu’s marketing department had simply identified an open flank.

That should have been the end of the tasting. It was not.

Later, I discovered that my entrance ticket included another tasting in the 1892 House. I had not expected a second tasting at all. More glasses appeared, properly arranged, with small snacks between the wines to clear the palate. The whole thing was controlled, informed and generous.

I had never been treated to a wine experience like it in Europe.

This was becoming a pattern. Alcohol was one of the discoveries of China that I had never expected to make.

At the Source

Modern Qingdao was a German creation. The Germans planned and built the port, streets, railway, sewers and public buildings of the new city. Among what they built was the brewery founded in 1903, which remains there today.

I knew about that German brewing inheritance before arriving. It was part of the reason for going.

What I had not expected was how good the beer would taste.

Tsingtao sold in Britain is still brewed in Qingdao rather than produced under licence. But a beer shipped halfway around the world cannot arrive with the same freshness as one drunk at its source. Time, storage, temperature and transport all intervene. There is also more than one Tsingtao. At the original 1903 brewery I could taste different versions beside each other rather than treating the name as though it described one uniform industrial liquid.

The beer was clean, fresh and alive. It tasted better there because it belonged there.

Rule 1 of Travel photos failed, take the photo before beginning enjoying yourself

That distinction matters. Modern alcohol companies teach consumers to recognise a label. Older drinking cultures recognised a product, a place and a method. The name was evidence of origin rather than a substitute for it.

Qingdao had preserved both.

A Polish Brewer in Russian Harbin

Then came Harbin.

The Harbin brewery predates Tsingtao. It was founded in 1900 by Jan Wróblewski, a Polish entrepreneur from the Russian Empire, while Harbin was being built as a Russian imperial railway city on the Chinese Eastern Railway, connected to the Trans-Siberian Railway.

Harbin 1900 describes itself on the label as a 100 per cent pure malt lager. That is an excellent claim. Malt is the traditional foundation of beer, before modern mass producers discovered the cheaper ingredients with which part of it could be replaced.

More than a century later, the beer still carries the history of the city that produced it.

The history was becoming unusually neat. German and British capital had established the brewery in the German-built city of Qingdao. A Pole from the Russian Empire had established the brewery in Russian imperial Harbin. China had taken the knowledge, absorbed the machinery and kept the beer.

The foreign presence receded. The breweries remained.

Wine Country

Yantai was the greater surprise.

I had not known that I was travelling into the centre of Chinese wine production. Qingdao is not far away, yet Yantai’s position on the northern side of the Shandong Peninsula gives it a different coastal climate and a serious wine industry.

Changyu was founded there in 1892 by Zhang Bishi, who brought in European vines and an Austro-Hungarian winemaker. It went on to produce China’s first industrially made wine and later its first brandy. That is enough history to understand the point: this was not an invented crest pasted onto a bottle last Tuesday.

The cellar was old, cool and convincing. The barrels and brickwork were real. So were the modern displays and the technology built around them. China had not turned the place into a mausoleum. It had kept the history working.

This was where the woman had singled me out after the scheduled tasting and brought over the award-winning red. It was not another sample left on the table. It was not part of the tasting flight. It was a separate glass of their best wine, poured for me after everyone else had gone.

The history mattered. The glass mattered more.

Then came the second tasting in the 1892 House—also included in my ticket, and entirely unexpected. More wines. Small snacks between them. Proper presentation. Changyu understood that heritage is not merely something to print on a label. It must be made tangible.

Old Methods and New Machines

I had seen the same principle in Chinese factories.

China does not regard inheritance and technology as opposites. It will retain an old cellar, install an interactive museum above it, build a smart factory outside the city and sell the resulting product through a phone. The old method is preserved where it still produces value. New technology is added where it improves scale, control or presentation.

Europe increasingly does something different. It retains the name, sells the history and alters the product.

China inherited European methods and turned them into living industries. Europe increasingly retains the trademarks while reducing what stands behind them.

What Drink Is For

China also remembers that alcohol has a function beyond intoxication.

It is a social solvent. It greases the machinery of business. It turns meals into negotiations and acquaintances into temporary friends. It softens courtship, supplies ritual and allows things to be said indirectly that might otherwise remain unsaid.

Europe once understood this without needing it explained. The pub, the wine table, the brewery and the village bar were pieces of social infrastructure. Alcohol belonged to place, season, work, courtship, argument and reconciliation.

Now it is increasingly treated as a taxable unit delivered by a multinational brand.

When the Name Replaces the Beer

Stella Artois and Newcastle Brown Ale are useful examples.

Both genuinely date from the 1920s, and the original Stella brewery at Leuven has a much older history. But the existence of a historical name does not make the modern product historically continuous. The British Stella version was reduced from 5 per cent alcohol to 4.8 per cent in 2012 and then to 4.6 per cent in 2020. Ireland received the same reduced-strength product. The branding, chalice and ancient dates remained in place while the liquid changed beneath them.

Newcastle Brown Ale suffered similarly. Originally brewed in a brewery next to St James’ Park, I could smell the brewery as a child when my Dad drove us through Newcastle centre to our Grandmothers house. It firstly moved out of the city centre to be brewed across the Tyne in Gateshead. Arguably, perhaps, it retained much of the heritage and ingredient sources, but is now brewed at Tadcaster, and if I read the ingredients, I find myself wondering how much of that was in the original recipe.

The names carried the history. The beer no longer had to.

Moretti possesses a real Italian lineage, but much of the beer sold under that name in Britain is now brewed in Britain. Place has been detached from provenance. Madrí dispenses with even that inconvenience. It was created in 2020, brewed in Yorkshire and dressed immediately in the costume of Madrid.

Europe has become very good at manufacturing foreignness.

Meanwhile, real British beers have disappeared. I remember Flowers. I remember Courage Directors, a rich, full-bodied bitter that tasted like beer rather than a chilled advertising campaign. The Flowers brewery itself closed in 1968. The name wandered through later contract-brewing arrangements after the place and company behind it had gone. Directors is now listed as no longer brewed.

These were not obscure liquids preserved only in enthusiasts’ notebooks. They were recognisable British beers. Once lost, they cannot be recreated merely by transferring the trademark to another factory.

The destruction continues. Britain ended 2025 with 137 fewer breweries than it had begun the year. Historic cask ales have been deleted, breweries closed and product ranges reduced as ownership has concentrated.

The knowledge still exists. The structure no longer rewards it.

The State at the Cellar Door

Tax has accelerated the decline.

Ireland imposes €3.19 of excise on an ordinary 750ml bottle of still wine and then charges 23 per cent VAT on the wine, the commercial margin and its own excise. The €3.19 duty therefore costs the buyer €3.92 at the till. On a €15 bottle, €5.99—almost 40 per cent of the entire price—is direct tax. Ireland also imposes minimum unit pricing, preventing a 12.5 per cent bottle from being sold below roughly €7.40 regardless of what the wine is worth.

Denmark uses the same method. The wine duty on a normal bottle is 8.45 kroner. Once 25 per cent VAT has been applied to that tax, it costs the buyer 10.56 kroner. On a bottle selling for 100 kroner, 28.45 kroner is excise and VAT.

Britain now charges about £2.87 of duty on a 75cl bottle at 12.5 per cent, followed by 20 per cent VAT. The consumer therefore pays £3.44 merely for the excise and the VAT imposed upon it, before considering the VAT on the wine and commercial margin. On a £15 bottle, approximately £5.37—nearly 36 per cent—is direct tax.

The state taxes the wine and then taxes its own tax.

Germany proves that this is a choice. It levies no excise duty on still wine. A €15 bottle carries 19 per cent VAT, amounting to €2.39 within the shelf price. The equivalent Irish bottle contains €5.99 in excise and VAT: two and a half times as much direct consumption tax.

Europe then wonders why drinkers retreat towards industrial products supported by enormous economies of scale.

Manufactured Sweetness

The wine market offers its own version of the same decline.

Vineyards are being grubbed up in Europe as consumption falls. At the same time, supermarket shelves fill with mass-produced imports whose principal achievement is consistency. Much of the Australian wine sold in Europe is absolute rubbish. Some of it is disgustingly sweet, with a suspiciously manufactured sweetness closer to an alcoholic soft drink than a proper wine. I do not trust it, and I will not buy it.

The contrast with Yantai was difficult to miss. In Europe I increasingly inspect bottles for signs that the contents have been manipulated into anonymous sweetness. In China I found a producer placing several wines in front of me, explaining the differences and providing food between them so that each could be tasted properly.

China was treating wine as a product worth understanding. Europe’s mass market increasingly treats it as a branded alcoholic delivery system.

What China Remembered

None of this was what I expected to find.

I came to China looking for scale, speed and new technology. I found those things. I travelled on the trains, walked through the cities and watched factories trying to remove human inefficiency from production.

But alongside the future I found old European knowledge still at work.

German brewing in the city the Germans built at Qingdao. A Polish brewer from the Russian Empire in Harbin. European vines and an Austro-Hungarian winemaker in Yantai. Malt, cellars, oak barrels, brandy and wine. Techniques imported during the age of concessions and railway empires, absorbed by China and carried forward after the foreigners had gone.

Europe exported the methods. China kept making the products.

Europe kept the labels, reduced the strength, moved the breweries, taxed the bottles and sold the remaining history through advertising.

China learned to turn heritage into an experience. Europe learned to turn it into a trademark.

I came to China expecting to see the future. I did not expect it to remind me what drink had once been: craft, place, hospitality and social movement.

China had not merely remembered how to make it.

It had remembered what it was for.

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